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Abstract 
 
 “Modern” agricultural markets are characterized by, among other things, quality requirements 
and vertical coordination. The nature of the industrial organization of the value chain depends on 
a variety of factors, such as local institutions, economic growth, demand, institutional 
infrastructure etc. In this paper we present a conceptual framework to explicitly integrate key 
characteristics of these “modern” agricultural markets and derive implications for price 
transmission and market power in these markets and value chains. 
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Price Transmission and Market Power in Modern Agricultural Value Chains 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent changes in global agricultural and food prices have had different impacts on 
domestic prices across many countries. These different effects have resuscitated interest amongst 
policymakers on the issue of price transmission, and the implications for producer and consumer 
welfare.
1
 There has been significant debate over to what extent high prices benefit producers.  
The debate was strongest for developing countries as some argued that consumers in 
developing countries were hurt by increasing food prices while producers were not benefiting 
from high prices for their products, increasing hunger and poverty.
2
  
However, also in richer countries the policy discussion on price transmission was 
stimulated. Evidence shows that in the EU, on average, produces prices varied more than 
consumer prices (Bukeviciute et al. 2009; Swinnen et al. 2013) but this does not necessarily 
imply asymmetric changes. Still, in the EU, it was argued that when agricultural commodity 
prices were on the rise in 2007/08, these increases were passed on to consumers but, when prices 
declined again in 2008/09, that these price declines were less than fully transmitted to consumers, 
hindering demand recovery and exacerbating the negative effect of declining producer prices on 
farm households (European Commission 2009). The European Commission (2009) argued that 
                                                 
1
 There is an intriguing difference in the policy reactions to high and low prices before and after 2007, as 
documented by Swinnen (2011) and Swinnen and Squicciarini (2012). 
2
 Empirical evidence also shows a mixed picture. FAO (2009) argued that in African countries such as Kenya and 
Mozambique, consumer prices rose significantly, while farmgate prices remained flat (FAO 2009). A review of 
cereal markets in 52 countries over the period 2007-2011 found that transmission of price shocks from the world 
market to domestic markets varied from 50% to 100% (Sharma 2011). Nick Minot (2012), on price volatility of 
agricultural and food commodities in Africa, found that only 7 out of 17 prices were more volatile since 2007, while 
17 were significantly less volatile. Jacoby (2013) found that the price hikes benefited poor rural households in India 
through positive wage effects. Headey (2011) and Verpoorten et al. (2013) found that, on average, self-reported food 
security improved in net food producing countries and in rural areas over the same period. 
3 
 
the observed discrepancies between producer and consumer price developments reflect 
‘structural weaknesses in the system, such as the number of intermediaries operating along the 
chain and the competitive structure’, and ‘pervasive inequalities in bargaining power between 
contracting parties.’ and established a “Task Force Food” within DG Competition to oversee 
competition in the food sector in 2012.
3
  
The transmission of price shocks has been studied extensively. There are different forms 
of price transmission. Transmission of price shocks at the consumer level (e.g. triggered by a 
demand shock) to producers in domestic markets – and vice versa – is referred to as vertical price 
transmission. Transmission of price shocks in the world market to domestic markets – and vice 
versa – is referred to as spatial price transmission. Imperfections in spatial price transmission 
have been attributed to factors including government intervention in markets (such as import 
tariffs and price stabilization measures), transport and marketing costs, the degree of processing, 
market structure and consumer preferences (e.g. if imported products are imperfect substitutes for 
domestic products) (e.g. Rapsomanikis 2011).  
Imperfect vertical price transmission, on the other hand, has most often been interpreted 
as providing evidence of market failure, such as the exercise of market power by processing 
companies and/or retailers, enabling them to capture supply chain rents and reduce social welfare 
(Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel 2004; Wohlgenant 2001). The existing literature mostly 
focuses on the effects for consumer welfare; and generally assumes a positive correlation 
between the degree of downstream vertical price transmission and consumer welfare – as a lower 
                                                 
3
 New evidence does not seem to support this claim of asymmetric price transmission: see various studies in the FP7 
TRANSFOP project (www.transfop.eu), including Hassouneh et al (2012), Kaditi (2013), Lloyd et al (2012) and 
Sckokai (2013).  
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degree of price transmission would attest to a greater share of the rents being captured by 
powerful intermediaries in the chain.  
However, this is not a consensus argument. There is also a set of studies refuting the 
direct link between the degree of price transmission and market power arguing that one should 
account for the incidence of vertical coordination in supply chains, the existence of increasing 
returns to scale, risk mitigating behavior by intermediaries, and the degree of processing 
(McCorriston et al. 2001; Wang et al. 2006; Weldegebriel 2004; Wohlgenant 2001). For example, 
Wang et al. (2006) show that in the presence of market power, price transmission can be weaker, 
identical, or even stronger than in the competitive markets case.
4
 
Most of the studies of price transmission focus on the transmission of (global and 
domestic) producer prices to consumer prices (Goodwin and Holt 1999; Chang and Griffith 1998; 
von Cramon-Taubadel 1998; Bonnet and Requillart 2012; Holm et al. 2012; Davidson et al. 
2012). Less attention has been paid to studying upstream vertical price transmission, i.e. the 
effects of price shocks originating in consumer markets on producer prices (Wohlgenant 2001). 
These effects are important however, as globalization and income growth have brought about 
important shifts in consumer demand, which are transforming supply chains all over the world, 
with important effects for local producers.  
In addition, most of the existing literature on price transmission is empirical in nature and 
builds upon theoretical work by McCorriston and Sheldon (1996) and McCorriston et al. (1998, 
2001). Relatively little attention has gone out to refining the theoretical assumptions underlying 
                                                 
4
 See Swinnen and Vandeplas (2010) for a review of existing studies on the welfare effects of concentration in 
supply chains, which show that potential negative welfare effects of concentration can be offset by efficiency gains 
due to scale economies, reduced transaction costs, enhanced incentives for R&D, countervailing bargaining power, 
and the sustainability of vertical coordination. 
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these empirical analyses (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel 2004), such as the changing 
architecture of markets.  
In this paper, we attempt to contribute to this field by theoretically examining how  
exogenous consumer price shocks (triggered for instance by income changes, global shocks, or 
by changes in consumer preferences) are transmitted to producer prices, taking into account the 
particular nature and institutional characteristics of (“modern”) agricultural and food markets and 
supply chains. Both Swinnen and Vandeplas (2010, 2011), who analyze global supply chains in 
emerging and developing countries, and Sexton (2012) and Crespi et al. (2012), who focus on 
U.S. markets, emphasize that production for “modern” markets requires consistency and strict 
adherence of products and production processes to quality and safety standards. This typically 
implies important investments by suppliers, but it often also entails substantial complementary 
costs for buyers. Moreover, both emphasize the need to incorporate vertical coordination as an 
institutional characteristic. More general, it is argued that economic analysis needs to explicitly 
consider this “new architecture of modern agricultural markets” as it has important implications 
for efficiency and equity. For example, Sexton (2012) argues that if high quality supply chains 
require vertical coordination, and if buyer sunk costs and transaction costs in finding new 
suppliers are significant, monopsonistic or oligopsonistic buyers may pay suppliers as much –or 
even more than competitive markets. Similarly, Swinnen and Vandeplas (2011) show that even 
with unequal bargaining power, buyers may pay suppliers “efficiency premia” to ensure quality 
supplies in environments with factor market imperfections and weak bargaining power.
5
 
                                                 
5
 Crespi et al. (2012) show that under such conditions, policymakers dealing with issues such as market power based 
on traditional models of agricultural markets (as highly competitive spot markets of homogeneous products) may 
devise policies running counter to their own objectives. 
6 
 
In this paper we integrate these arguments to study price transmission. We develop an 
extended version of the model of Swinnen and Vandeplas (2011) and integrate insights from 
Sexton (2012) and use this model to show that price transmission depends on the nature of 
vertical coordination and different types of transaction costs in the supply chain. Our analysis 
shows that price transmission is likely non-linear in these supply chains. We identify implications 
for empirical studies. We also show that, contrary to what is often assumed in empirical research, 
weaker price transmission from consumer to producer prices does not necessary imply a welfare 
loss for suppliers. 
 
2.  Modern Value Chains and Contracting Costs   
As explained in the introduction, production for “modern” markets requires consistency 
and strict adherence of products and production processes to quality and safety standards. While 
there are important similarities between models focusing on rich countries and those analyzing 
global emerging and developing markets, there are also differences between the two strands of 
literature, in particular regarding the nature of the transaction costs and associated market 
governance. Sexton and colleagues focus on the role of search and switching costs associated 
with quality and consistency requirements in developed economies. While these types of 
transaction costs are also increasingly important in emerging and developing economies, the 
latter are further characterized by major imperfections in rural factor markets and poor contract 
enforcement institutions. These give rise to additional transaction costs and different vertical 
coordination strategies. To incorporate these differences, we will develop a “general” theoretical 
framework for the analysis of price transmission in agricultural supply chains, accounting for 
quality requirements, contract-specific investments, factor market imperfections, imperfect 
contract enforcement institutions and market power. 
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Adherence to quality and safety standards typically implies important investments by 
suppliers, but it often also entails substantial complementary costs for buyers. Like Sexton (2012) 
and Swinnen and Vandeplas (2011), we do not consider sunk costs in processing infrastructure, 
but focus on supplier-specific contracting costs.  
In our analysis, we use the concepts of (supplier-specific) “buyer investment” and 
“contracting costs” interchangeably, since we interpret (and model) them as the cost of the 
investment which the buyer needs to make in order to make a transaction possible. 
We focus on four types of contracting costs: search (or switching) costs incurred in the 
process of identifying suitable producers; the costs of training suppliers to produce high-quality 
commodities, which may imply the use of new technologies or complying with new standards; 
monitoring costs to ensure that suppliers apply the technology as has been recommended; and the 
costs of providing external inputs (e.g. fertilizers, credit, seeds, and/or other types of technology). 
We focus on these because (a) they have been described as important in the literature; (b) they 
differ in two important characteristics which allows to develop a classification of contracting 
costs along two dimensions; and (c) because these dimensions importantly influence the effects 
of the contracting costs (as we will show). The two key dimensions are whether there are cost 
advantages for working with a repeat supplier vis-à-vis working with a potential new supplier; 
and whether the supplier-specific investment has a value for the supplier outside of the existing 
contract.  
 
Cost advantage of repeat suppliers 
Some contracting costs are the same for first-time and repeat suppliers alike since they need to be 
incurred for each production cycle. This is the case for instance when the buyer is prefinancing 
external inputs for its suppliers. In many developing and emerging countries processors provide 
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their suppliers under contract with seeds, pesticides, and fertilizer in crop production and feed in 
livestock production (e.g. Bellemare 2012; Birthal et al. 2005; Gow et al. 2000).  
Another example is when the buyer has a system in place to monitor contract compliance 
– e.g. in the form of a set of field officers who conduct field visits on a regular basis. By means of 
illustration, consider the following quote from Minten et al. (2009: 1733) on monitoring in high 
value vegetable production in Madagascar: 
“To monitor the correct implementation of the supplier contracts, the [processor] has … 
around 300 extension agents who are permanently on the payroll … Every extension 
agent, the chef de culture, is responsible for about 30 farmers. To supervise these, (s)he 
coordinates five or six extension assistants … that live in the village itself. … During the 
cultivation period of the vegetables under contract, the contractor is visited on average 
more than once … a week ... to ensure correct production management as well as to avoid 
“side-selling.” … 99% of the farmers say that the firm knows the exact location of the 
plot; 92% of the farmers say that the firm will even know … the number of plants that are 
on the plot. For some crucial aspects of the vegetable production process, representatives 
of the company will even intervene in the production management to ensure it is rightly 
done.”  
 
Other contracting costs are non-recurring, and only need to be paid at the start of a 
collaboration between a buyer and a supplier. Working with a repeat supplier, for which these 
costs have already been borne, is then cheaper than contracting a new supplier. An example are 
search costs, which are incurred to identify a suitable supplier. For example, Sexton (2012: 215) 
points out that “transaction costs of engaging with repeat suppliers will likely be considerably 
less than transaction costs of locating and contracting with new suppliers”.  
Another example are training costs. A new supplier typically needs to be trained to 
become familiar with buyer preferences and standards, and possibly with the use of new 
technologies. Being trained confers a cost advantage to repeat suppliers compared to potential 
new suppliers.  
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Value of investment outside of the contract 
Another dimension of these contracting costs is their residual value to the contracted supplier 
outside the contract.
6
  Some types of buyer investments do not have a value for the supplier 
beyond the existing contract. Examples include search costs and monitoring costs.  
Other types of costs may have an important residual value outside of the existing contract. For 
example, before being applied to crops, external inputs can be used by the supplier for other 
purposes (e.g. fertilizer use for other, non-contracted, crops) or sold on the secondary market. 
Even after being applied to crops, external inputs convey additional value to suppliers, which 
may be realized outside of the contract, for instance when the contracted supplier sidesells his 
produce to alternative buyers.  
Also training costs can have a value outside of the contract, depending on the degree of 
specificity of the training (Becker 1962). Training increases a supplier’s human capital. This is an 
intangible asset which can be used in other activities and may have a long-lasting positive impact 
on the supplier’s opportunity cost of labor. 
 
Classification of contracting costs 
Considering the two dimensions discussed above, we can classify contracting costs into four 
“types” – as illustrated in Table 1. Monitoring costs and the costs of providing external inputs are 
recurring costs and do not provide a cost advantage to repeat suppliers; search costs and training 
costs are non-recurring and therefor do provide a cost advantage to repeat suppliers. External 
                                                 
6
 The costs under study are all “supplier-specific”. Hence, once incurred, none of these costs has any residual value 
to the buyer/investor outside of the current contract relationship. This would have been different if we would have 
considered sunk costs in infrastructure by the buyer for example. 
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inputs and training have a value to the supplier outside the contract while monitoring and search 
costs do not.  
For didactic purposes, we consider “pure” forms of the four types of contracting costs in 
the rest of the paper. In reality, of course, the boundaries between these four types are not always 
clear-cut. Some of the contracting costs may have mixed characteristics. For example, training 
may be a combination of an initial investment at the start of a collaboration between a buyer and 
a supplier; supplemented by regular training sessions, possibly at the beginning of each 
production cycle, in which suppliers receive updates of best practices. In such case, the relative 
cost advantage of a repeat supplier to a new supplier depends on the relative importance of initial 
training sessions vis-à-vis the updates.  Similarly, Dries et al. (2009) document how some of the 
investments in external inputs in the Eastern European dairy sector can be considered as non-
recurring investments (e.g. cheap loans for equipment and herd upgrading), while other 
investments, such as feed concentrate, are incurred for each production cycle. In this paper, when 
we talk about “external inputs” we have the latter in mind, i.e. those costs that are incurred for 
each production cycle.  
 
3.  A Model of Modern Value Chains 
Consider the case where a “supplier” (for example a farm) can sell products to a “buyer” 
(for example a trader or a retailing or processing company).
7
 Assume the buyer can offer a 
contract to the supplier, which includes the conditions (time, amount and price) for purchasing 
the supplier’s products, and selling these products (possibly after processing) to consumers – 
either domestically or internationally – in a quality-differentiated product market at a unit price  
                                                 
7
 Our basic set up is based on Swinnen and Vandeplas (2011).  
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  . We assume that consumer demand is perfectly elastic at price    and that this implies a 
quality premium for the buyer over his variable production costs.
8
 This quality premium may for 
instance result if the buyer is a “gate-keeper” to the high-value market (Inderst and Mazzarotto 
2008);
9
 or if consumers are paying a “quality-assuring price” (Klein and Leffler 1981).  
To produce q units of a high-quality product, the supplier needs to invest an amount l of 
own resources (e.g. labor or land). We assume the supplier’s opportunity cost of these own 
resources is  .̅ If, for example, his best alternative use of these resources were to produce 1 unit of 
another product, then  ̅      with    the price of the alternative product – which could be a low-
quality product for the local spot market.  
In our model we use two parameters, α and γ to capture the two dimensions of contracting 
costs as defined in section 2. We assume that the production of high-quality agricultural products 
requires the buyer to invest an amount of contracting costs k, with  ̅ the buyer’s opportunity cost 
of this investment. The parameter   represents the cost advantage for the buyer of working with 
repeat suppliers vis-à-vis new suppliers. The effective investment costs are       ̅ where 
     for new suppliers or for recurring investments, which need to be done for each production 
cycle, irrespective of the supplier; and     for repeat suppliers, when investments are entirely 
consisting of non-recurring costs. Hence,     [   ]   
We define the residual value of the investment for the supplier outside the contract as a 
fraction α of  ̅  its value within the contract. The less specific these investments are, the higher 
their value outside of the contract will be, i.e. the higher α. If an investment does not have any 
value outside the contract for the supplier, α = 0. 
                                                 
8
 Or, as in Klein and Leffler (1981), over his “salvageable” production costs – whether fixed or variable. 
9
 Take for example the case of fruits and vegetables exporters in Sub-Saharan Africa, where high food standard 
requirements increase the costs of entry for potential exporters, eventually leading to consolidation of the export 
supply base (Maertens and Swinnen 2008). 
12 
 
The resulting equilibrium and price transmission pattern will depend on the bargaining 
power of the buyer and supplier and on the conditions for enforcement of the contract. We 
consider two extreme situations: one where the contract is perfectly (and without costs) enforced 
and another when there is no external enforcement of the contract and the contract needs to rely 
on internal enforcement. 
 
4.  Price Transmission with Perfect Contract Enforcement 
If formal contract enforcement institutions work well and costless (or if a supplier does 
not have an attractive opportunity for contract violation once a contract is agreed upon), the 
“perfect enforcement” outcome results. For contracts to be realized both agents’ participation 
constraints need to be satisfied. For the supplier, this means that his income Y must cover the 
opportunity cost of own resources  
     ̅  (1) 
For the buyer, it means that his income   must cover at least his opportunity cost of the capital 
invested in the contract:  
        ̅.  (2) 
 The contract surplus   is the net value created by the contract after subtraction of the 
opportunity costs of all invested resources:  
            ̅   .̅   (3) 
This surplus will be shared between buyer and supplier according to a fixed sharing rule β 
with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 the share of the supplier.10 As is usual in a Nash bargaining process, both 
                                                 
10
 The determination of  β is a question which has received a lot of attention in the theoretical literature but, as yet, 
has not been fully resolved (see e.g. Doyle and Inderst 2007). One part of the literature argues that β should be 0.5 in 
the case of perfect information and in the absence of uncertainty (e.g. Nash 1953); while another part of the literature 
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participants to the contract receive the opportunity cost of the resources they invest in the 
contract, topped up with a share of the contract surplus determined by β. The contract (Y, Π) then 
implies the following incomes: 
{
     ̅   (            ̅      ̅)
        
 
(4) 
The resulting producer price    is easily obtained by dividing Y by q:   
   [    (           ̅      ̅)]    (5) 
If we assume that the supplier’s fallback option is to produce low-quality goods ( ̅     ), and that 
there is no output effect from shifting from low-quality production to high-quality production (q 
= 1), then Equation (5) reduces to: 
       [               ̅]  (6) 
which is equivalent to            if        Note that, if    , there are no gains to be 
made from high-quality production, and the supplier will produce for the low-quality market, 
with            
The second part of the right hand side term in Equation (6) shows how the producer price 
is a function of the difference in the price of low-value and high-value products        , 
contracting costs        ̅, and the bargaining rule (β). The producer price is positively (and 
linearly) related to the consumer price and to the sharing rule. The higher the consumer price for 
high-quality products      and the higher β, the higher  
 . 
We now look at how shocks in consumer prices are transmitted to prices at the supplier-
level. Price transmission can be defined as            and is illustrated in Figures 1(a) and 
2(a) with       in price region A where               ̅ (meaning   ≤ 0). In this price 
                                                                                                                                                              
argues that in the real world β may reduce to 0 in a context of extremely unequal bargaining positions (e.g. Svejnar 
1986). 
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region, price transmission is zero. By producing low-quality goods, the supplier is shielded 
against shocks in the high-quality market (although he may be prone to shocks in the low-quality 
market).  
If              ̅ , the producer price is no longer fixed but varies with changes in 
the consumer price for high-quality goods (  ). There, price transmission              . As 
the producer price is determined through a bargaining process, an exogenous price shock in the 
consumer price     will be transmitted to the producer only partially. The degree of price 
transmission equals the share of the surplus that the producer gets. This, of course, is not 
surprising since a change in the consumer price affects the surplus and the change in the  surplus 
is distributed in the same way as the initial surplus.
11
   
The process of bargaining for price determination partially isolates the farmer from the 
market. The lower β, the stronger he is shielded from price shocks – both when prices go up and 
when they go down. It reduces the negative effect when prices fall, but it also reduces his gains 
when prices rise. In the extreme case where the surplus share of the supplier is zero (   ), the 
supplier is pushed back to his opportunity cost, and the buyer is the residual claimant of the full 
surplus. In this case, there will be no price transmission at all to the supplier-level. Every change 
in the surplus (either an increase or a decrease) is absorbed by the buyer. 
In summary, with perfect contract enforcement and the higher β is, the larger the surplus 
share which is appropriated by the supplier, and the stronger the degree of price transmission is. 
Hence, within this scenario the traditional logic holds, that the stronger the degree of price 
transmission is, the stronger supplier benefits are – hence there is indeed a positive correlation 
                                                 
11
 Note that with perfect enforcement, price transmission is not affected by contracting costs. 
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between β and p0 (or Y0). Note, however that this also implies that the suppliers are more exposed 
to price volatility and that they will lose more when prices decline.  
 
5.  Price Transmission with Imperfect Contract Enforcement 
If contracts are not perfectly enforceable, the outcome may be different. Opportunistic 
behavior may lead to hold-ups if one of the agents has an attractive alternative to contract 
compliance. In particular, if the supplier can use the investment costs borne by the buyer to 
realize more value outside the contract than within the contract, and if contract enforcement is 
imperfect, a supplier will be tempted to violate the contract.  
In practice, contract breach by the supplier can take many forms. For example, in the case 
where a buyer prefinances the supplier’s input costs, the latter can divert these received inputs to 
other uses, such as selling them or applying them to other production activities. An alternative 
way to hold up the buyer is when the supplier applies the inputs to the crops, as agreed in the 
contract, but then sells the high-quality output to an alternative buyer, who may or may not value 
the product as much as the contracted buyer. 
In the case of training costs, opportunistic behavior can arise in a similar way. Instead of 
applying his own resources (land and labor) in combination with the received training to produce 
high-quality goods; the supplier can use his training to earn additional income, e.g. using his time 
and new skills in different production activities, or by producing high-quality goods for other 
buyers.  
We assume that in case of contract breach, the supplier can realize his opportunity cost of 
labor, in addition to a fraction   of  ̅, with   ̅ the value of the buyer’s investment which the 
supplier can realize outside the contract. The higher  , the more attractive contract breach will 
16 
 
be. We also assume that by doing this the supplier will incur a cost     This cost can be 
interpreted in several ways: it can reflect a reputational cost, the loss of social capital, or the loss 
of future business opportunities (see e.g. Keefer and Knack 2005 for a review).
12
 The supplier 
payoff in case of contract breach is thus  ̅    ̅    . 
Consider the extreme case that there is no external enforcement of contracts. In this case, 
contracts have to be self-enforcing. A self-enforcing contract requires that the supplier’s contract 
income Y must cover at least his potential income from non-compliance with the contract. This 
condition constitutes the supplier’s incentive compatibility constraint. Hence, in addition to the 
supplier’s and the buyer’s respective participation constraints (see Conditions (1) and (2)), the 
contract must satisfy the supplier’s incentive compatibility constraint:   
   ̅    ̅    .  (7) 
 A self-enforcing contract (Y, П) then implies the following incomes: 
{
      [ ̅   (            ̅      ̅)   ̅     ̅   
 ]
        
.  
(8) 
with Y the supplier’s income and П the buyer’s income from the transaction. 
The supplier price,    , in this contract is:  
   
 
 
   [ ̅   (            ̅      ̅)   ̅     ̅   
 ].  (9) 
The first term in the maximand in Equation (9) is the supplier price under perfect 
enforcement (see Equation (6)). This constitutes the lower bound to the supplier price under 
imperfect enforcement. The supplier price may be higher, however, if the supplier has an 
                                                 
12
 Swinnen and Vandeplas (2011) model an additional alternative for contract breach: if the supplier uses the 
acquired investment to produce a high-quality product, but sells it on better terms to an alternative buyer, one can 
show that a contract needs to fulfil an additional condition to be self-enforcing, which depends on q and on the price 
a supplier can fetch on the spot market for the high-value product. This issue is ignored in this paper for reasons of 
simplicity, but taking it on board should not affect our main conclusions. 
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attractive option outside of the contract, once the buyer has made the required investment. In 
particular, if    is sufficiently high (such that   ̅       (           ̅      ̅)   the second 
term of the maximand in Equation (9) will bind and the producer price under imperfect 
enforcement will exceed the producer price under perfect enforcement.  
If we assume the supplier’s best alternative option is to produce one unit of a low-quality 
product, and if    , Equation (9) can be rewritten as: 
      [    (               ̅ )        ̅   
 ].  (10) 
Hence, the producer price under imperfect enforcement will be at least as high as under perfect 
enforcement, of course conditional upon the contract being sustainable. As for sustainability, the 
contract specified in Equation (8) should satisfy the buyer’s participation constraint, which is 
        ̅  (see Condition (2)). In combination with Conditions (1) and (7), this condition 
imposes a lower bound on     Only if    is sufficiently high, is it possible to set the contract 
terms such that both agents’ participation constraints as well as the supplier’s incentive 
compatibility constraint are simultaneously satisfied. The specific conditions for contract 
feasibility are summarized in the following restriction on   :
13
 
     
                  ̅            ̅   
    (11) 
This condition captures two major reasons for potential contract failure. First, if      
         ̅, the net surplus of the transaction will be negative, and there is no incentive for 
contract formation. Second, and more importantly, if             ̅ but smaller than 
              ̅ –  
   (=          ̅       ̅   
   with   ̅     the net benefits of 
contract breach), the contract surplus is positive, but the surplus is too small to allow the buyer to 
                                                 
13
 We implicitly assume that the buyer can commit to the contract; see Swinnen and Vandeplas (2011) for when this 
is not the case. 
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offer a price to the supplier which makes him comply with the contract. Under these conditions, 
the contract will not be realized, despite its potential positive contribution to social welfare. 
These conditions are represented by price regions A and B in Figure 1(b). When the potential 
surplus is negative (region A) or when the potential surplus is too low for the buyer to pay a 
sufficiently high price to the supplier (region B) there will be no contract and the income for the 
supplier will be his reservation income   .  
Once consumer prices are high enough such that         +           ̅ –  
 , 
contracting will occur and producer prices will increase. With imperfect contract enforcement, a 
buyer will have to pay his supplier a premium on top of the perfect enforcement outcome to 
prevent violation of the contract after the buyer has paid the contracting costs.  
We refer to this premium as an “efficiency premium” ε, which equals the difference 
between the supplier’s price under (costless) perfect enforcement (p0) and his price under costly 
enforcement (  ):         . Making the contract “self-enforcing” by paying an efficiency 
premium is a rational strategy for a buyer if it earns him a better payoff than his outcome when 
being held up; or his outcome when not engaging in a transaction with the concerned supplier, or 
any other one.  
In Figure 1(b), this efficiency premium ε is represented by the difference between the full 
line and the dashed line. Notice that over price region C the producer price will be fixed at 
           ̅   
 . This implies that the efficiency premium will adjust to reflect the 
difference between    and p0. This also means that price transmission is zero in this region (see 
Figure 2(b)). Note however that in region C producer prices are higher than they would be when 
there would be perfect enforcement (and stronger price transmission), represented by the dashed 
line in Figure 1(b). In region B however, the producer price with perfect enforcement is higher 
19 
 
than with imperfect enforcement. Note that all this implies that there is no direct relationship 
between price transmission and producer incomes.  
Once consumer prices increase further to where          +        ̅     ̅    
     
(region D), producer prices will follow the increase in producer prices. Producer prices are 
       (             ̅)    
 , the price with perfect enforcement. In this case price 
transmission is also β.         
Figure 2 illustrates the variation in price transmission over the consumer price region. 
Price transmission (τ) is zero for price changes within regions A, B and C. However note that if 
the consumer price changes between region B and  C there is a large, discontinuous price effect 
for producers. Similarly, if the consumer price shifts between regions C and D there is a 
discontinuous effect.  
Finally, note that our discussion of the impact of consumer price shocks on suppliers 
involved in vertical contracts has focused on price shocks originating in the high-quality market. 
Welfare of suppliers involved in high-quality supply chains may as well be affected by price 
shocks originating in the low-quality market. A price change in the low-quality market will affect 
   and it is obvious from Figures 1(a) and 1(b) that this would affect the shape of the high-quality 
price function. 
 
6. Effects of Contracting Costs 
It is clear from our analysis that the amount and nature of the contracting costs (reflected 
in the γ and α parameters) plays an important role. They affect both the shape of the producer 
price function and the size of the different price regions, which together determine the process of 
price transmission. The impact of the different costs is illustrated explicitly in Figure 3. Panel 
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3(a) illustrates the impact of differences in α. Recall that   is an indicator for the value a supplier 
can realize based on the buyer’s contract-specific investment outside of their joint contract. A 
higher   implies more benefits for a supplier from the associated (higher) efficiency premium. 
This is reflected in the upward shift of the function for the C- region, and in the enlargement of 
the C-region, for which the price transmission is zero. However at the same time a higher α 
makes internal contract enforcement harder. This is reflected in the rightward shift of the function 
and the enlargement of the B- region where contracting is not possible. 
 Panel 3(b) illustrates the impact of γ, which captures the impact of search and training 
costs. With lower costs (and hence a higher γ), the price function shifts to the left. With lower  
costs there is more surplus which makes contracting easier. This causes the shift to the left with a 
smaller A region. With more surplus in the contract, the first term in Equation (10) is larger and 
more likely to bind, reflected in a larger D-region. 
 Note, however, that these changes in the function do not change the key findings that 
price transmission is discontinuous and inconsistent with the traditional logic, in which a positive 
correlation is assumed between producer prices (and hence producer welfare) and the degree of 
price transmission.  
  
7. Contract Enforcement and Market Power 
 Our model and its results, as summarized in Figures 1, 2 and 3 also yield additional 
insights in the concept of “market power” in these modern supply chains. An obvious indicator of 
market power is the distribution of the surplus between the agents in the chain. With perfect 
enforcement (as in Figure 1(a)) the distribution is captured by  , the (exogenous) sharing rule as 
defined in Section 4 (and discussed in Footnote 10). Hence   measures market power in this case. 
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However, this is not necessarily the case with imperfect enforcement. As is illustrated in Figure 
1(b), the contract is feasible over price areas C and D. In area D,   is an indicator of market 
power, as in the perfect enforcement situation, since it reflects the share of the surplus that goes 
to the two agents. However, this is not the case in area C. In this price range the share of the 
surplus that goes to the supplier is higher than  . Hence   is not a good indicator of the effective 
market power in area C.  
Hence, we can now go beyond the simple (exogenous) sharing rule   which defines the 
supplier’s bargaining position under perfect enforcement, and define an (endogenous) ex post 
bargaining power    as the share of the contract surplus he effectively receives. Combining 
Equations (3) and (9) we can derive that :  
      (  
  ̅   
           ̅    ̅
).      (12) 
It is clear that    is increasing in the ex ante sharing rule ( ) but also in parameter α, which 
reflects the value of the buyer’s complementary investment outside of the contract. Note that the 
additional benefits a supplier derives from a “high α” contract do not depend on β. Hence, even 
with very strong “ex ante” buyer market power (β very low), if α is sufficiently high (and 
  sufficiently low), the buyer will have to pay an efficiency premium to the supplier in order to 
secure his supplies.   Hence, even companies which dominate the market – such as in the case of 
monopolies – will have to share their surplus as the effective market power of supplier will be 
stronger than the market structure suggests.  
 
8.  Concluding Remarks 
The empirical literature on price transmission usually assumes that perfect competition 
amongst buyers makes farmers best off; and that perfect competition will result in perfect 
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transmission of price shocks along the supply chain, as buyers operate at a zero profit margin. A 
shortcoming of most models in the literature is however that these models assume that factor 
markets work well and that contracts are enforced; and they often ignore vertical coordination 
and search and monitoring costs. However these factors are important in reality. While factor 
markets work imperfectly mostly in less developed regions, vertical coordination occurs in many 
sectors in modern food chains, and search costs can be significant everywhere. These conditions 
not only have major implications for the distribution of rents in food supply chains, but they also 
have an important impact on price transmission.   
The specific architecture of modern supply chains which often involves vertical ties and 
requires crucial investments by buyers in contract-specific costs implies that the traditional logic, 
which assumes that weaker price transmission is associated with lower supplier welfare as 
powerful intermediaries in the supply chain are capturing all rents, is no longer universally 
applicable. In particular, we have shown formally that in vertically coordinated high-quality 
supply chains, conditions may arise under which farmers are better off in a context where price 
transmission is weaker. Our analysis also shows that price transmission is discontinuous and 
depends on the nature and the amount of contracting costs. This obviously has important 
implications for empirical research in this area.  
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Table 1: A Typology of Contracting Costs 
 
 
Value outside of the contract 
(for supplier) 
 
α = 0 α > 0 
Cost advantage of 
repeat supplier 
(for buyer) 
γ = 0 
 
Monitoring costs 
 
External inputs 
γ > 0 
 
Search costs 
 
Training costs 
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Figure 2: Price transmission (τ) 
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